Philosophy and Literature in Latin America presents a unique and original view of the current state of development in Latin America of two disciplines that are at the core of the humanities. Divided into two parts, each section explores the contributions of distinguished American and Latin American experts and authors. The section on literature includes the literary activities of Latin Americans working in the United States, an area in which very little research has been demonstrated and, for that reason, will (...) add an interesting new dimension to the field of Latin American studies. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between rationality and happiness from ancient Greek philosophy to early Latin medieval philosophy. What connection is there between human rationality and happiness? This issue was uppermost in the minds of the Ancient Greek philosophers and continued to be of importance during the entire early medieval period. Starting with theSocrates of Plato's early dialogues, who is regarded as having initiated the eudaimonistic ethical tradition, the present volume looks at Plato, Aristotle, the Skeptics, Seneca [Stoicism], Epicurus, Plotinus (...) [neo-Platonism], Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and ends with Abelard, the final major figure in early medieval philosophy. Special efforts are made to reveal and trace the continuity and development of the views on rationality and happiness among these major thinkers within this period. The book's approach is historical, but the topics it treats are relevant to many discussions pursued in contemporary philosophical circles. Specifically, the book aims to make two major contributions to the ongoing development of virtue ethics. First, contemporary virtue ethics often draws distinctions between ancient Greek ethics and modern moral philosophy [mainly utilitarianism and Kantianism], and seeks to model ethics on ancient ethics. In doing so, however, contemporary virtue ethics often ignores the transition from Greek ethics to the early Latin medieval tradition. Second, contemporary virtue-based ethics, in its efforts to seek insights from ancient ethics, centers on virtue. In contrast, in ancient and medieval ethics, virtue is pursued for the sake of happiness [eudaimonia], and virtue is conceived as excellence of rationality. Hence, the relationship between rationality and happiness provides the framework for ethical inquiry within which the discussion of virtue takes place. Contributors: JULIA ANNAS, RICHARD BETT, JORGE J.E. GRACIA, BRAD INWOOD, WILLIAM MANN, JOHN MARENBON, GARETH B. MATTHEWS, MARK L. McPHERRAN, DONALD MORRISON, C.C.W. TAYLOR, JONATHAN SANFORD, JIYUAN YU. Jiyuan Yu is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Jorge J. E. Gracia is Samuel P. Capen Chair and SUNY Distinguised Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo. (shrink)

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature (...) which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality. (shrink)

Latin America - its people, its politics, its economy - has burst upon the world scene with powerful images that have captured the curiosity of many English-speaking North Americans. The strategic importance of this vast region to the stability of the Wes.

The discussion of the relation of levels of reality to categories is important because categories have often been interpreted as constituting levels of reality. This article explores whether this view is correct, and argues it is not. Categories as such should not be understood to constitute levels of reality, although particular categories may. The article begins with a discussion of levels of reality and then turns to specific questions about categories and how they are related to these levels.

Although most predicates may be truthfully predicated of only some beings, there are others that seem to apply to every being. The latter, including being itself, were known as the transcendentals in the Middle Ages and gave rise to the much disputed doctrine of the transcendentals. This article explores the main tenets of the doctrine and the difficulties that they face, the reasons why scholastic authors were interested in these issues, and the origins of the doctrine.

A first-of-its-kind book that seriously and profoundly examines what it means philosophically to be Latino and where Latinos fit in American society. Offers a fresh perspective and clearer understanding of Latin American thought and culture, rejecting answers based on stereotypes and fear Takes an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophical, social, and political elements of Hispanic/Latino identity, touching upon anthropology, history, cultural studies and sociology, as well as philosophy Written by Jorge J. E. Gracia, one of the most influential (...) thinkers of Hispanic/Latino descent. (shrink)

This article discusses Suárez''s views concerning the transcendentals, that is, being and those attributes of it that extend to everything. In particular it explores Suárez''s notion of transcendentality and the way in which he conceived the transcendental attributes of being are related to it. It makes two claims: First, that Suárez has an intensional, rather than an extensional understanding of transcendentality; and, second, that Suárez''s understanding of truth and goodness, as expressing real extrinsic denominations based on real relations, appears to (...) contain an inconsistency. (shrink)

HISPANIC PHILOSOPHY. The notion of Hispanic philosophy is a useful one for trying to understand certain historical phenomena related to the philosophy developed in the Iberian peninsula, the Iberian colonies in the New World, and the countries that those colonies eventually came to form. It is useful for two reasons. First, it focuses attention on the close relations among the philosophers in these geographical areas; and second, other historical denominations and categorizations do not do justice to such relations. This becomes (...) clear when one examines the standard general categorizations according to which the philosophical thought of the mentioned geographical areas is divided and studied: Spanish philosophy, Portuguese philosophy, Catalan philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Spanish-American philosophy, and Ibero-American philosophy. (shrink)

My focus here is on two questions: Does philosophy have a place in contemporary American public life? and should philosophy have a place in American public life? Because my answer to the first question is negative, I also will discuss some of the reasons why I believe philosophy does not play a role in American public life. I suggest that philosophers have been excluded from the public conversation in part because the work of philosophy entails criticism and challenge—activities best accomplished (...) from “outside” of the structures of power. This means that we have a role in public life, but it is an indirect role, as teachers and critics, not as advisers and active participants. (shrink)

IF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY studies ideas from the past, as is generally accepted, then historians of philosophy face a serious problem concerning their object of study for two reasons. In the first place, like all history, the history of philosophy is concerned with the past and we can never have direct empirical access to the past unless that past is close to us and we have taken part in it. In order to know the past in which we have (...) not participated we must rely on the testimony of those who had direct access to it and left records of what they witnessed. In the second place, the problem arises because the specific object that the history of philosophy studies is ideas and ideas are not things, events, or facts for which we can have direct empirical evidence even if we are contemporaneous with them. The most we can have is indirect empirical evidence. We do not perceive ideas; what we perceive are certain phenomena that suggest to us certain ideas. If I ask you, for example, "Do you approve of what the President did?" and you frown in return, I conclude that you do not. But it is altogether possible that you do in fact approve of the President's action, although you wish me to think that you do not and thus mislead me by making the frown. My conclusion that you do not, then, can be taken only as an interpretation of what you are thinking based on certain empirical evidence that is only indirectly related to what you think. Thus the study of the history of philosophy is very difficult, more difficult than the study of the type of history that relies on events for which there can be direct empirical evidence; for not only is direct access to the past impossible for historians of philosophy from the present, but even if they had it they would not have direct access to the ideas which are supposed to be the object of their study. (shrink)

This article argues for two theses. The first is that many of the sociological factors endemic in the philosophical community function as barriers to the recruitment of members of minority groups in the profession and to their functioning as public intellectuals. The division into familial groups, the fights for security and success, and the weakness of the federal organization of the American Philosophical Association all contribute to these barriers. The second is that sociology has a place in philosophy, even though (...) it should not be confused with it. This means that philosophers need to consider social phenomena. (shrink)

Systematically analyzes the nature of metaphysics.

This paper investigates the problem of numerical continuity in thomistic metaphysics and attempts to point out the principle of identity in material substances. it has three parts: the first clarifies the issue and presents the possible alternatives; the second rejects various solutions which have been proposed by interpreters of thomas aquinas such as matter, form, accidents, and substance; and the third part argues that within thomistic metaphysics it is only existence ("esse") that may be considered as an acceptable candidate for (...) this ontological role. (shrink)

The presence and impact of Hispanics/Latinos in the United States cannot be ignored. Already the largest minority group, by 2050 their numbers will exceed all the other minority groups in the United States combined. The diversity of this population is often understated, but the people differ in terms of their origin, race. language, custom, religion, political affiliation, education and economic status. The heterogeneity of the Hispanic/Latino population raises questions about their identity and their rights: do they really constitute a group? (...) That is, do they have rights as a group, or just as individuals? This volume, addresses these concerns through a varied and interdisciplinary approach. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Faith and Reason God's Existence The Names of God Theology and Metaphysics How We Know Universals Individuation Conclusion.

A provocative examination of the artistic interpretation of twelve of Borges’s most famous stories.

The claim that metaphysics is fundamental has frequently been voiced in the history of the discipline. However, the usual ways in which this claim is justified do not appear to be effective. This article aims to fill this gap in meta-metaphysical theory by providing a credible justification of the fundamentality of metaphysics in two steps. The first consists in establishing a set of five conditions of fundamentality for the discipline. The second consists in showing that these conditions are satisfied when (...) the object of study of metaphysics is identified with an ontologically neutral object, namely categories, and the task of the discipline is taken to be the determination of the number and identity of the most general categories and the relation of less general categories to the most general ones. (shrink)